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Abstract
We report on an integrated photonic transmitter of up to 100 MHz
repetition rate, which emits pulses centered at 850 nm with arbitrary am-
plitude and polarization. The source is suitable for free space quantum
key distribution applications. The whole transmitter, with the optical and
electronic components integrated, has reduced size and power consump-
tion. In addition, the optoelectronic components forming the transmitter
can be space-qualified, making it suitable for satellite and future space
missions.
1 Introduction
In many applications, free space optical (FSO) communications is the technol-
ogy of choice to transmit information, especially when fiber optical cabling is not
easily achievable or its installation is too expensive [1]. Compared to radio fre-
quency (RF) techniques, its main advantages lie in high data rates (up to several
Gb/s), minimum free space losses due to the small optical beam divergence and
absence of regulatory issues thanks to the low interference level [2–4]. Therefore
FSO communication is favorable for high data-rate, long-range point-to-point
links, where the terminal size, mass, and power consumption are subjected to
strong limitations, such is the case of aeronautical or space platforms.
An important issue in today’s information society is the security of data
transmission against potential intruders, which always put at risk the confiden-
tiality. Current methods to increase security require that two parties wishing to
transmit information securely need to exchange or share one or more keys. Once
the key has been exchanged, the information can be transferred in a provable
secure way using a one-time pad. Therefore, the security of the information
transmission is based exclusively on the security of the key exchange. Quantum
cryptography, or more precisely Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), guarantees
absolutely secure key distribution based on the principles of quantum physics,
since it is not possible to measure or reproduce a state (eg. polarization or
phase of a photon) without being detected [5]. The key is generated out from
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the measurement of the information encoded into specific quantum states of a
photon. In particular, if a two-dimensional quantum system is used, information
is said to be encoded into qubits. For example, a qubit can be created using
properties such as the polarization or the phase of a photon.
The first QKD scheme, due to Bennett and Brassard [6, 7], employs single
photons sent through a quantum channel, plus classical communications over a
public channel to generate a secure shared key. This scheme is commonly known
as the BB84 protocol. Although single photon sources may be very useful for
quantum computing, they are not strictly required for QKD. This, and the
relative difficulty of generating true single photons, motivates new approaches
based on conventional light sources [8]. Indeed, attenuated laser pulses or faint
pulse sources (FPS), which in average emit less than one photon per pulse, are
often used as signals in practical QKD devices. The performance limitations of
attenuated pulse systems had initially led to believe that single photon sources
would be indispensable for building efficient QKD systems. However, the intro-
duction of the decoy-state protocol [9, 10] made possible a much tighter bound
for the key generation rate, achieving an almost linear dependency of the latter
on the channel transmittance. In this way, the technologically much simpler
faint pulse systems can offer comparable QKD security with respect to single
photon sources. Another key feature of QKD is that the security is linked to
the one-time-pad transmission, i.e. the key has to be used once and has to be
equal or similar in size to the information being transmitted. It is thus ev-
ident the importance of developing faint pulse sources and systems for QKD
which can generate high key bit rates. The highest Secure Key Rate reported
to date over 20 Km of optical telecom fiber is of 1.02 Mb/s [11] and 14.1 b/s
over 200 Km [12], while the achieved speed over 144 Km free space link is of
12.8 Kb/s [13] and 50 Kb/s over 480 m [14].
The goal of QKD is to allow to distant parties to share a common key in the
presence of an eavesdropper. Therefore, the most important question of QKD is
its security. Therefore, an important aim of this work is to demonstrate a system
to generate pulses that differ only in polarization, while being indistinguishable
in the other degrees of freedom that characterize the quantum state of photons,
such as arrival time, optical frequency, and spatial mode. In other words, to
generate pulses which contain no side-channel information correlated to the
polarization. We note that previous implementations based on multiple lasers
[13–16] have attempted to achieve time-frequency indistinguishability by laser
pre-selection, current and temperature adjustment, and temporal and spectral
measurements. Apart from being expensive and cumbersome, this kind of tuning
has limited stability due to the inevitable aging of laser diodes. It is worth
noting that the temporal and spectral distributions reported to date indicate
indistinguishability in the time and frequency bases, but leave open the question
of distinguishability based on other pulse characteristics such as chirp.
A related issue which arises in a decoy-state protocol is possible side-channel
information indicating the pulse intensity. Intensity level modulation could be
achieved rapidly and conveniently by modulating the laser current. This method
of modulation, however, induces strong nonlinearities and causes strong phase
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modulation, which makes it difficult to control the temporal and spectral shape
of the output pulses.
In this paper we report the development of a novel integrated pulse source
which can reach rates as high as 100 Mb/s at 850nm modulated in amplitude
and polarization. For QKD applications, it has been simulated that the source
could achieve a Secure Key Rate of the order of 500 Kb/s at 20 Km using decoy-
state protocol. The source is capable to generate pulses at around 850 nm with
at least three different intensity levels (i.e. number of photons per pulse) and
four different polarization states. The proposed FPS ensures indistinguishability
among the different intensity and polarization pulses and ensures phase inco-
herence of consecutive generated states. It is based on a single diode emitting a
continuous pulse train externally modulated in amplitude and polarization. The
wavelength, reduced power consumption, compactness and space qualifiable op-
toelectronic components constituting the source make it very suitable for space
transmission, for free space quantum and classical communication links. One
of the foreseen applications is its use to overcome the distance limit of QKD in
optical fibers [12,17], by creating a global security network among very distant
places on earth through satellite communication [18–20].
2 The integrated faint pulse source
In order to use it for space applications, the proposed integrated FPS source
for FSO communication consists of commercially available space-qualified dis-
crete components; single semiconductor laser diode emitting a continuous pulse
train at 100 MHz followed by integrated (waveguide) amplitude and polarization
lithium niobate (LiNbO3) modulators (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Schematic of the QKD source. [LD] denotes a laser diode, [AM]
an amplitude modulator, [PM] a polarization modulator and [VOA] a variable
optical attenuator.
A distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode (LD) at around 850 nm is driven at
100 MHz train of electrical pulses. The optical pulse of about 400ps is generated
via a current pulse of about 1ns duration. In fact, the laser is biased using a
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DC current of 24mA, far below threshold 36mA, and it is directly modulated
using a strong RF current of 50mA (peak value) so that the optical pulse is
generated [23]. The generated optical pulses do not have any phase coherence
among them due to the fact that the laser is set below and above threshold from
one pulse to the subsequent one, thus producing a random phase for each pulse.
The output mirror reflectivity (R) of the DFB structure is 30%, the cavity length
(Lc) 300µm and the active medium refractive index (n) 3.6 [21,22]. The round-
trip-time (RTT) given by 2Lcn/c0, where c0 is the speed of light in vacuum,
is ≈ 20ps. In one pulse train period (10ns) the optical pulse power left in the
laser cavity, after going below threshold, has bounced back and forth ≈ 500
times. Between pulses, the laser is biased at only 66% of threshold, so that
transmission loss through the output mirror is much greater than the round-trip
gain. Conservatively assuming a round-trip loss ≥ 1dB, the ≥ 500dB loss from
500 passes will atenuate any coherence to a very low level. At the same time,
incoherent spontaneous emission is generated, further obscuring any possible
coherence between optical pulses [23]. In terms of partial coherence theory, it is
expected a first-order degree of coherence g(1)(τ) which drops rapidly to zero for
τ larger than the pulse duration. This is consistent with the observed spectrum,
which implies a coherence length of order 0.75 m during the pulse. Note that
the spectrophotometer response is produced by photons coming from the pulses
and the coherence length of about 0.75 m which can be calculated from the
measured bandwidth, as it was explained above, decreases significantly when
the pulse extinguishes, thus making the inter-pulses value much smaller than
the distance between consecutive pulses (about 3 m).
In this way, phase incoherence of consecutive generated states, which oth-
erwise would be detrimental for the link security, is achieved. Then, the pulse
train is sent through a polarization maintaining fiber (PMF) into an amplitude
modulator (AM) (eg. a Mach-Zehnder modulator in LiNbO3) that will ran-
domly generate the three different levels of intensity. Note that if the DFB laser
diode were driven in pure continuous wave (CW) mode (no pulse train) and ex-
ternally modulated to generate the pulses, two potential issues would occur: (i)
pulses with different energies (number of photons) would unavoidably have dif-
ferent temporal and spectral shapes due to the nonlinear electro-optic response
(optical output as a function of driving voltage) of the amplitude modulator;
(ii) there would be phase coherence between the pulses due to the relatively
long coherence time (narrow spectrum) of a DFB structure, thus increasing the
vulnerability of the QKD transmission [24].
After the AM, the pulses are injected into a polarization modulator (PM)
through a PMF. The polarization modulator is in fact a waveguide LiNbO3
phase modulator where the PMF input axis is oriented at 45◦with respect to
the optical axis. In this way, the two orthogonal equal amplitude polarization
components of the electromagnetic field that propagates in the crystal experi-
ence a refractive index difference, which is proportional to the voltage applied
to the modulator. By applying different voltages one can thus change the state
of the output polarization, in particular linear +45◦, -45◦, right-handed circular
and left-handed circular. The optical pulses present a spectrum within the ac-
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ceptance bandwidth of the two modulators, so that amplitude and polarization
modulation can be achieved with high extinction ratio.
A proper electronic control of the different intensities and polarization states
generated, at Alice, for the different states is fundamental in order to perform
a QKD transmission. The synchronization and setting of the different optical
components of the source is implemented by an automatic control which is
split into two working operations. The control system first synchronizes and
calibrates the driving signals timings and amplitudes to the AM and PM, and
secondly generates the appropriate driving signals for the BB84+Decoy protocol
transmission.
For the implementation of a QKD system using decoy-state protocol, besides
four different polarization states, the FPS source should generate three inten-
sity levels (optimally 1/2, 1/8 and 0 photons in average per pulse [10]) using
a variable optical attenuator (VOA) in order to operate in the single photon
regime. The optical pulse duration ≈ 400ps and the pulse peak power 3.5mW
which corresponds to 1.4pJ energy per pulse, thus a number of photons per
pulse ≈ 6 ·106. In order to get a mean photon number for the signal state which
is within an optimum range for the distances of interest [10], the VOA has to
introduce an optical attenuation of ≈ 70dB.
The chosen FPS wavelength (850 nm) is optimum for free space opera-
tion considering attenuation (due to scattering, absorption and diffraction) and
single-photon detector’s quantum efficiency [8].
3 Description of generated states
In a BB84 protocol scheme implementing the decoy-state protocol different
pulses should differ in polarization and amplitude while remaining indistinguish-
able in other characteristics, including temporal shape and frequency spectrum.
If the pulses differ in spectrum, for example, an eavesdropper could use spec-
tral measurements to infer the sent polarization without actually measuring it.
Removal of this kind of side-channel information is thus critical to the security
of the protocol. Since the information is encoded in the polarization state, the
statistical similarity between pulses of different polarizations but same intensity
level is more relevant than that of different intensity level but same polariza-
tion to prevent information leakage from the quantum link. Here we consider
the quantum optics of side-channel information, limiting the discussion to pure
states and simple measurements. A full treatment including mixed states and
generalized measurements will be the subject of a future publication.
We consider a source that produces pulses with amplitudes El, polarizations
pl and pulse shapes Πl(t). Without loss of generality we assume the polar-
izations and pulses shapes are normalized p∗l · pl =
∫
dtΠ∗l (t)Πl(t) = 1. In a
classical description, the field envelopes are
El(t) = ElplΠl(t) (1)
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The corresponding quantum state is a generalized coherent state
|αl〉 ≡ Dl(ηElpl) |0〉 (2)
where |0〉 is the vacuum state and Dl(x) ≡ exp[x ·A†l − x∗ ·Al] is a displace-
ment operator, defined in terms of the mode operator Al ≡
∫
dtΠ∗l (t)a(t), a ≡
(ax, ay) is a vector of annihilation operators, with [ap(t), a
†
q(t
′)] = δ(t − t′)δp,q
for p, q ∈ {x, y}. A scaling factor η is included to convert from photon units to
field units, chosen such that the positive-frequency part of the quantized elec-
tric field is Eˆ(t) = η−1a(t). It is easy to check that 〈αl|a(t) |αl〉 = ηElplΠl(t),
so that the average quantum field〈αl| Eˆ(t) |αl〉 = ElplΠl(t) in agreement with
Equation 1.
Quantum mechanics allows measurements on the pulse-shape Π without
measurement of the polarization p. For example, the number operator Nl ≡
A†l ·Al = A†l,xAl,x +A†l,yAl,y counts photons in the mode Πl independent of pl.
If the modes {Πl} are different, an eavesdropper could use state-discrimination
techniques [25, 26] to determine l (and thus the secret key) without disturb-
ing p. This kind of eavesdropping would not be detected by Bob’s polariza-
tion measurements. For this reason, it is critical to guarantee that this kind
of side channel information is not present in the sent optical pulses. The
similarity between the various Πl can be quantified by an overlap integral:
[Al,p, A
†
m,q] =
∫
dtΠ∗l (t)Πm(t)[ap, a
†
q] ≡ Slmδp,q, so that for example two states
with equal amplitudes |El| = |Em|, 〈αm|Nl |αm〉 / 〈αl|Nl |αl〉 = |Slm|2. Finally,
we note that it is possible for pulses to have the same spectra and temporal
shape but still be distinguishable, for example if they have different chirp. For
this reason, establishing that two (or more) distinct sources produce indistin-
guishable pulses is not easy.
Our strategy to eliminate side-channel information in the pulse shapes is
to dissociate pulse generation from the setting of polarization and amplitude
levels. As described in the previous section the FPS consists of a single laser
diode emitting a continuous train of optical pulses followed by an AM, a PM and
a VOA. Considering that the laser operation is the same for each pulse sent, and
that both the AM and PM control voltages are held constant over the duration
of the pulse, we can assume that the pulse shape does not depend on the sent
amplitude and polarization. This assumption is confirmed by measurements
shown in Section 4. The complex expression of the pulsed electromagnetic field
exiting the FPS can be written as
E(t) =
∑
i
Aαie
jφiejβi
xˆ+ ejγi yˆ√
2
Π (t− iT ) (3)
where t is the time, T is the pulse train period and A, φi,Π are the amplitude,
phase, and shape, respectively, of the optical pulse generated by the LD. αi, βi
describe the transmission and introduced phase, respectively, of the AM. γi is
the phase difference between xˆ and yˆ introduced by the polarization modulator
in order to generate the different polarization states.
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Another security consideration is optical coherence between successive pulses,
which could in principle be used for eavesdropping attacks [24]. As the LD is
taken below threshold between pulses, each new pulse will start up from vac-
uum fluctuations, and will have a random overall phase φi, thus eliminating
coherence between successive pulses and thus among states. Similarly, any in-
formation contained in the AM phase βi is washed out by the random φi.
4 Experimental measurements
Figure 2 (a) shows the train of optical pulses generated by the laser diode when
driven by electrical pulses of 1 ns at 100 MHz. The resulting optical pulse
duration is about 400 ps. Since the obtained cw train of optical pulses are
all generated in the same way, they can be assumed to be indistinguishable
thus having no side-channel information. Furthermore, the short optical pulse
duration of 400 ps (small duty cycle) has the advantage to increase the signal to
noise ratio since the measurement window (detection time) in the receiver can
be reduced. The DFB laser diode is driven in direct modulation with a strong
RF driving signal with 24mA DC bias current, far below threshold 36mA, thus
producing highly similar optical pulses and jitter as low as 100ps, rise time
65ps and fall time 129ps, as shown in Figure 2 (b). From Figure 2 (b) one
can see that the ringing of the laser driver current is repeatable from pulse to
pulse, thus producing the overlapped temporal profile of several optical pulses,
captured in real-time. The traces are indistinguishable by eye, indicating a very
small pulse-to-pulse variation of energy, timing, and wave-form. Furthermore,
the optical pulse bandwidth is small enough to enter the acceptance bandwidth
of the subsequent polarization modulator.
Figure 3 (a) shows the three different intensity optical pulses generated af-
ter the AM. The attenuations for the medium and low level of intensity pulses
are about 4.65dB and 14.76dB, with respect to the high intensity pulse. While
Figure 3 (b) shows the four polarization states generated after the PM, as mea-
sured with a terminating rotating waveplate polarimeter. The RF modulating
signal is driven at 100 MHz, in this way, chirp produced at the pulse edges of
the RF driving voltage is avoided and intensity and polarization indistinguisha-
bility is obtained. Figure 4 shows pulses with the same polarization but with
different intensity levels with the aim of comparing its temporal and spectral
indistinguishability. A 8 GHz amplified photodiode and a 4 MHz resolution
Fabry-Perot interferometer were used for the temporal and spectral measure-
ments, respectively. In order to compare pulses with different intensity levels,
the different pulses are normalized to their own total intensity. Fig. 5 shows
a similar comparison, but this time pulses have the same intensity level and
different polarization.
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Figure 2: Laser diode output and laser driver output results. (a) Generated
cw train of optical pulses at 100MHz experimental results. The optical pulses
at 100MHz are generated using a DFB laser diode (upward pulses) directly
modulated using the driving RF electrical pulses (negative pulses). (b) Time
distribution of five pulses from the laser diode and the laser driver.
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Figure 3: Amplitude and polarization modulators experimental results. (a) Am-
plitude modulator experimental results. Different intensity levels are generated
at 100 MHz, where the modulator window is much larger than the pulse time
width. (b) Different polarization states are generated (shown on the Poincare
sphere), in particular it is shown four polarization states: +45◦, -45◦, right-
handed circular and left-handed circular; sufficient to implement a BB84 proto-
col.
5 QKD performance analysis
Given the experimental data on the classical optical performance of the proposed
source, a low Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) as well as a high Secure Key
Rate in the order of Mb/s are expected. A simulation-based analysis of the
expected rates and performances of a QKD BB84, implementing decoy-state
protocol, is derived below as a demonstration of the potentials for applications
of the proposed FPS.
In a BB84 only single photon pulses contribute to the secure key while in a 3-
state decoy protocol one can obtain a lower bound for the secure key generation
rate as
R ≥ qNµ
t
{−Qµf (Eµ)H2 (Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2 (e1)]} (4)
where q depends on the implementation (1/2 for the BB84 protocol), Nµ is
the total number of detected signal pulses, t is the time duration of the QKD
transmission, µ represents the intensity of the signal states, Qµ is the gain of the
signal states, Eµ is the total QBER, Q1 is the gain of single photon states, e1 is
the error rate of single photon states, f (x) is the bi-direction error correction
efficiency (taken as 1.16 [10], for an error rate of 1%) as a function of error rate,
and H2 (x) is the binary Shannon information function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) (5)
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Figure 4: Temporal (a and c) and spectral (b and d) profiles for pulses with
three intensity levels. The curves in (c) and (d) have been scaled to allow shape
comparison. As expected, these show a high degree of similarity, indicating
minimal distortion of the pulses by the amplitude modulator.
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Figure 5: Temporal (a) and spectral (b) profiles for pulses with four polarization
states. As expected, these show a high degree of similarity, indicating minimal
distortion of the pulses by the polarization modulator.
Figure 6 shows the free space link distance dependence of the Raw Key
Rate, Secure Key Rate and QBER. The same parameters used for the 20 Km
experiment are used for all the distances considered.
6 Results and discussion
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the driving RF and corresponding
optical pulses for the three levels of intensity, suitable for a decoy-state protocol.
We believe that, should they be needed, larger intensity attenuation could be
achieved by improved DC voltage bias of the AM. The AM driving RF signal
and the corresponding AM output quality largely demonstrate the 100 MHz
and even beyond capability of the source. The modulator ”ON” window has a
duration of at least 5 ns, much larger than that of the optical pulse. Therefore,
only the amplitude of the optical pulse changes, while the temporal and spectral
shape remain unaltered. In addition low driving voltages are needed, making the
design suitable for electronic integration with low electrical power consumption
drivers.
Table 2 summarizes the RF voltages driving the PM generating the four
orthogonal states. In the same table, cross polarization extinction ratio (PER)
values for the four different polarization states are given. The PER values ob-
tained (>25dB) are significantly higher than those required for a low QBER
(20dB). As for the AM case, low driving voltages are needed, suitable for inte-
gration with low power consumption and inexpensive electronics.
As expected, Figure 4 and 5 show the high degree of similarity of the pulses,
independently of their polarization or intensity state, indicating minimal pulse
distortion due to the AM and the PM. It has to be noticed that the small dif-
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Figure 6: QKD BB84 implementing decoy-states simulation results. Raw Key
Rate (blue solid line), Secure Key Rate (red dashed line) and QBER (green
dotted line). In the simulation the detectors efficiency was set to 50%, free space
loss 0.1dB/Km, 5dB were accounted for the loss due to the transmitting and
receiving optical systems, background yield 1×10−5 and detector misalignment
error of 1%. All the parameters used in the simulation are consistent with
experimental values reported in [10].
Table 1: Relevant parameters of three generated pulse intensity levels with the
amplitude modulator. The RF driving voltages needed are below 1V, which are
suitable to be integrated.
Pulse AM driver RF signal [mV] Optical attenuation [dB]
High intensity level 460 0 (reference)
Medium intensity level 745 4.65
Low intensity level 920 14.76
Table 2: Relevant parameters of four polarization states generated with the
polarization modulator. Again, the RF driving voltages needed are low (below
1.5V), which are suitable to be integrated. The obtained polarization extinction
ratio (PER) largely exceeds the value (> 20 dB) needed to achieve a low QBER.
Polarization PM driver RF signal [V] PER [dB]
+45◦ 0 25.66
−45◦ 1.56 25.84
Right-handed circular 0.81 25.65
Left-handed circular −0.76 25.10
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Table 3: Summary of the QKD simulation parameters and results for a 20 Km
BB84 transmission, implementing the decoy-state protocol using the experimen-
tal data for the FPS. The computed values are for a 20 Km free space distance,
where µ, ν1 and ν2 are the signal, decoy 1 and decoy 2 (ideally vacuum) states,
which have been presented in the previous section, with rates of 0.85:0.10:0.05,
respectively. The computed values are the gains for the signal Qµ, decoy 1 Qν1
and decoy 2 Qν2 states. The QBER for the signal states eµ, the gain and QBER
for the single photon pulses, Q1 and e1, respectively. Finally the lower bound
of the secure key rate Rsecure, for the presented source, turns out to be 559.80
Kb/s.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Free space link length 20 Km Qµ 4.87× 10−2
µ 0.5 Qv1 1.70× 10−2
ν1 0.125 Qv2 1.68× 10−3
ν2 0.0167 eµ 1.01%
Prob(µ:ν1:ν2) 0.85:0.10:0.05 Q1 3.47× 10−2
t 1s e1 1.01%
f (Eµ) 1.16 Rsecure 559.80 Kb/s
ferences for the different intensity pulses are due to measurement errors. Nev-
ertheless, as commented in section 3 polarization statistical similarity is more
important than intensity statistical similarity. Furthermore, information on the
absolute or relative phase between pulses is not contained in these four figures.
However, by design, the phase of each pulse varies at random between pulses
due to the fact that, as already mentioned, pulses are generated by taking con-
tinuously the laser diode above and below threshold, as explained in section
3.
In the simulation the detectors efficiency was set to 50%, free space loss
0.1dB/Km, 5dB were accounted for the loss due to the transmitting and receiv-
ing optical systems, background yield 1×10−5 and detector misalignment error
of 1%. Note that the background yield Y0 includes the detector dark count and
other background contributions from stray light, including scattered light from
timing pulses [10, 13], being for larger distances the major cause of secure key
rate drop. The parameters, derived from the values presented above, and results
for the simulated BB84 transmission, implementing the decoy-state protocol as
well as for free space distance of 20 Km, are shown in Table 3. The simulation
has been completed using values taken from [10,11], achieving a theoretical Se-
cure Key Rate of 559.80 Kb/s, which is consistent with the free space achieved
value of 50 Kb/s (over 480 m) reported for a 10 MHz source in [14] taking into
account that the presented source emits pulses with a repetition rate one order
of magnitude larger.
The laser diode is DC biased at 24mA presenting a DC resistance of 3Ω
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accounting for 1.7mW. In addition, an impedance matching circuit has been
designed to 50Ω for RF modulation where the electrical pulses of 50mA, 1ns
wide, at 100MHz account for 12.5mW. The modulators do not have a termi-
nation resistor, basically, they present an open-ended transmission line with an
equivalent loss resistor and parallel capacitor of 5Ω and 10pF, respectively. Con-
sidering the worst case situation where the source is at maximum modulation
speed and using the maximum driving voltages, the power consumption for the
AM is 2.7mW and for the PM is 7.7mW. Thus, the overall power consumption
of the integrated module is potentially very low.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that, starting from commercially available and space-qualifiable
components, it is possible to build an integrated transmitter capable of generat-
ing the several intensity and polarization states required for decoy-state QKD.
The experimental demonstration has been carried out at 850 nm with 100 MHz
modulation rates. However, taking into consideration that the modulators band-
width can go well beyond 10 GHz and operate also at other wavelengths (e.g.
1550 nm), the source can be easily scalable to higher bit rates, the upper limit
being probably given by the laser diode itself, and other transmission systems
(e.g. optical fibers).
Although we believe that the proposed source is of general use in polarization
modulation optical systems, especially free-space links, we have focused our
demonstration in preparation for a QKD experiment using decoy-state protocol,
where the indistinguishability of the pulses, both in the frequency and time
domain, is the key for the security of the link. Given the relatively low driving
voltages of the modulators, the proposed transmitter is potentially low power
consumption and also highly integrable.
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